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ABSTRACT 
In this paper I seek to explore what kind of socialist system can best make good on the 
socialist commitment to equity; democracy and solidarity -- in the wake of the failure of the 
political-economic systems of the USSR and Eastern Europe. I identify and explore two 
alternative models of socialism -- market socialism and participatory socialism -- and conclude by 
endorsing a form of democratic self-managed market socialism. 
Jntroduction 
What is socialism really all about? The revolutionary events of 1989 in Eastern Europe, 
and the enormous changes that have been taking place in the Soviet Union since then, have raised 
this question with renewed acuity. 
The idea of socialism developed historically out of opposition to the reality of capitalism. 
The basic goals of the movement. for socialism have thus been formulated in reaction to the 
perceived ills of capitalism. To condense an enormous literature on the subject of socialist goals, I 
would suggest that socialism has been committed. most fundamentally to the following objectives: 
(1) Eauity: as  against the capitalist reality of great inequalities of income and wealth, 
socialism calls for a much more egalitarian distribution of economic outcomes and 
opportunities by class, race, gender, region, etc. 
(2) m c r a c y :  as against the institutional framework of liberal democracy in the political 
sphere, which has characterized the most democratic of capitalist societies, socialism calls 
for a much truer and deeper democracy -- one that enables people more fully to exercise 
control over their own economic fate. 
(3) Solidarity: as  against the celebration of the individual under capitalism, socialism calls 
for the promotion of solidarity among members of communities extending from the 
neighborhood to the whole of society -- encouraging people to develop the sense and the 
reality of themselves as  social rather than simply individual beings. 
In addition to its commitment to these goals that distinguish it from capitalism, socialism 
has historically been committed to the improvement of people's material standards of living. 
Indeed, in earlier days many socialists saw the promotion of improving material living standards 
as the primary basis for socialism's claim to superiority over capitalism, for socialism was to 
overcome the irrationality and inefficiency seen as endemic to a capitalist system of economic 
organization. In the present time -- a t  least in the more affluent parts of the world, where 
capitalism has brought substantial improvements in living standards and where problems of 
ecological balance loom more important than problems of starvation or malnutrition -- this growth 
objective has receded in importance for socialists. However, the extent to which any resource- 
using economic or social objective can be achieved -- whether it be improving the environment or 
eliminating hunger -- remains dependent on the degree of efficiency with which the system of 
economic organization operates. I will therefore articulate -- as do most socialists: explicitly or 
implicitly -- one additional important socialist. objective: 
(4) Efficiencv: socialism requires that resources be used wisely and non-wastefully in order 
that resource-using economic and social goals can be more successfully achieved. 
In this paper I seek to explore what kind of socialist system can promise to make good on 
the socialist commitment to these goals, in light of the manifest failure of the political-economic 
systems of the USSR and Eastern Europe to do so. I will begin in section I by discussing the 
implications of the events of 1989; this leads me to identify two potentially fruitful models for 
socialism in the future -- market socialism and participatory socialism. Sections I1 and I11 explore 
in turn each of these two forms of socialism; I pose and seek to answer questions with which 
critics have challenged the advocates of each. I conclude in section IV by articulating the kind of 
socialism that seems to me to hold the greatest promise of living up to time-honored socialist 
ideals. 
I. The implications of 1989 
There can be no doubt that  1989 marks a watershed in the history of socialism. Although, 
as we now know, the disintegration of the political-economic systems of the USSR and  astern 
Europe had already been underway for a t  least a decade, 1989 was the year in which the failure 
of these systems became visible to one and all. As people took to the streets in Eastern Europe, 
rulers scrambled to disassociate themselves from the old order. Even in the Soviet. Union itself, 
after the failed coup against Mikhail Gorbachev in August 1991, it has become perfectly clear that  
there can be no return to the political-economic system of Lenin, Stalin and Brezhnev. 
The events of 1989 are clearly the main reason why we (and many others) are now7 
discussing the future of socialism. Of course, the conventional wisdom is that  socialism has no 
future -- only a past. As Robert Heilbroner (1989: p.4) put it: "Less than 75 years after the 
contest between capitalism and socialism officially began, it is over: capitalism has won." We on 
the Western Left reject that  conventional wisdom, because we argue that  where there has been 
economic failure -- in Eastern Europe, in the Soviet Union, if not in all of the Communist-Party- 
directed socialist economies -- it has  not been a failure of true socialism, but of something very 
different. 
Is there anything, then, for us to learn from 1989? Indeed, I believe there are several 
important lessons. 
First of all, we must recognize that  Communist-Party-directed socialism -- the type 
characteristic of all actually existing socialist systems the world has known1 -- is a worse 
economic failure than most of us have previously been willing to admit. In the Soviet Union and 
1. I will consistently use the term "Communist-Party-directed" (or the abbreviated "CP-directed") 
to describe the kind of socialism that  has actually existed in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, 
China, Cuba, Vietnam and North Korea. There are of course many other adjectives that have 
been used to characterize this type of socialism -- "actually existing," "bureaucratic state," 
"centrally planned,", etc. -- and some have even called i t  a form of (state) capitalism. I prefer 
"CP-directed" because it underlines in a compact way the authoritarian, hierarchical, bureaucratic 
nature of both the political and the economic system. 
Eastern Europe, a t  least, it has not only failed in recent decades to provide much growth and 
efficiency; it has also failed to achieve real equity, it has been ecologically disastrous, acd its 
provision for basic needs and social services has generally been a t  a very modest level.2 And, of 
course, this system has always been extremely undemocratic, and almost always deeply 
alienating to its workers and citizens. 
Second, we cannot simply dismiss this dismal record as having nothing to do with 
socialism. Of course CP-directed socialism is a far cry from the democratic, egalitarian and 
solidaristic society that most of us on the Left have advocated. There are even some Western 
Leftists who have consistently refused to apply the label "socialist" to the societies a t  issue. 
Nonetheless, most Western Leftists are to some extent tainted by the record of the CP-directed 
state socialist countries. 
For one thing, these countries have exhibited certain characteristics that have been 
associated with socialism, not just by CP officials and old-fashioned socialists, but by many 
contemporary Western Leftists -- e.g., society-wide control of capital formation, strict limitation of 
the role of private ownership, strong curbs on the operation of markets, guarantees of employment 
and basic social services to all citizens. Moreover, many on the Left have compared aspects of the 
performance of the CP-directed socialist economies -- e.g., their long-term growth record, their 
egalitarianism, their social services -- favorably with that of capitalist economies. Even when 
such a favorable comparison is justified by the evidence (e.g., in comparing many of Cuba's social 
achievements with those of other Latin American countries), to claim that it represents any kind 
of victory for socialism is to accept that what has been constructed in countries like Cuba is indeed 
a form of socialism. 
2. In these respects the accomplishments of CP-directed socialism have been somewhat more 
impressive in less developed economies such as those of China and Cuba, especially as  compared 
with their own past experience; but even in these more favorable instances there have been many 
disappointments. 
Confronted with such concerns, many of us have held out hope that a t  least some of the 
CP-directed socialist systems -- however distorted' and unsatisfactory their current structure -- 
might evolve toward a truer form of so~ ia l i sm.~  This again lends credence to the notion that the 
CP-directed socialist systems do have something to do with the socialism that we advocate. 
Perhaps, then, 1989 represents the vindication of a small minority of Western Leftists -- 
those who have always sharply criticized the CP-directed socialist systems and who have 
consistently refused to consider them as having anything whatsoever to do with socialism. There 
are two main schools of socialist thought on the Western Left that have been "pure" in this 
respect; I believe that they can usefully be characterized as  liberal-democratic and eommunitarian, 
respectively. 
Liberal-democratic socialists have stressed the general socialist goal of democracy, arguing 
in particular that liberal democracy -- a political system including constitutionally protected civil 
rights and liberties, democratic elections, etc. -- is an absolute prerequisite for a socialist society 
worthy of the name. This implies that socialist economic institutions, designed to promote such 
other socialist goals as  equity and solidarity, must be built upon a liberal-democratic political 
foundation. The construction of socialist society is seen not as the replacement of "bourgeois 
democratic institutions" by some entirely different and superior form of democracy, but as 
deepening the democratic nature of these institutions and extending them from the political 
through the social to the economic arena. From this perspective, the authoritarian character of 
3. This is the implication of a quotation from Serge Mallet that I and my co-authors endorsed in 
the introductions to all three editions of Edwards, Reich and Weisskopf (1972, 1978, 1986). 
Mallet (1970: p.45) asserts that the societies of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe are to true 
socialism "what the monsters of the paleolithic era are to present animal species: clumsy, abortive 
prototypes." 
4. I do not include Trotskyist Marxists among those who have consistently rejected CP-directed 
socialist systems, because -- although they have been among the most acerbic critics of Stalinism 
and of the Soviet Union for a t  least half a century -- they do not reject all forms of communist 
party control over socialism. 
political rule in all of the CP-directed socialist societies has disqualified them from the very start 
as exemplars of so~ ia l i sm.~  
Communitarian socialists are also committed to democracy, but democracy of a less liberal 
and more participatory kind. In the communitarian vision it is the socialist goal of solidarity 
which receives the greatest emphasis -- people are to develop and sustain solidarity as active 
participating members of communities ranging from the neighborhood and the workplace to the 
society as  a whole. The political and economic institutions of liberal democratic capitalism are to 
be discarded; what is envisaged is a revolutionary transformation to an egalitarian participatory 
society in which people jointly and directly control their own fate. .From this perspective, the CP- 
directed socialist societies are rejected because of their retention of many of the individualistic 
patterns and hierarchical structures of capitalist societies, as  well as  for their betrayal of 
democratic ideals. 
Liberal-democratic socialists generally advocate a form of democratic market socialim, in 
which liberal democracy is combined with an economic system characterized by predominantly 
collective forms of ownership of the means of production and by the use of markets as  the 
predominant means of resource allocation and distribution -- subject to some government planning, 
intervention and regulation. Collective ownership is designed to promote egalitarianism in both 
economic and political spheres; markets are seen as indispensible both to individual freedom of 
choice and to eMicient resource allocation; and government regulation is seen as  necessary to 
5. Liberal-democratic socialists are for the most part not closely associated with Marxism; 
however, some do consider themselves Marxist and see Communist Parties as  having betrayed the 
principles of Marxism. The most prominent liberal-democratic socialists in the United States are 
associated with Dissent magazine, notably the late Michael Harrington; see, for example, 
Harrington (1989). 
6. Communitarian socialists include Marxists who identify with Marx's long-run vision of a truly 
communist society as  well as  "new Leftists" who reject many elements of the Marxist tradition. 
One of the best known exponents of this school of thought in the United States is Noam Chomsky; 
for a detailed discussion of what a communitarian socialist society would look like, see Albert and 
Hahnel (1991). 
assure that  the general interest prevails'over particular interests and to limit the development of 
substantial inequities. 
Communitarian socialists generally advocate a form of democratic participatorv socialism, 
in which there is collective social control of the means of production and in which decentralized 
participatory planning institutions replace the market as a mechanism for resource allocation and 
distribution. This is a vision of socialism in which, to put it in Marxist terms, both exploitation 
and'alienation are  overcome; thus not only private property but also markets must be abolished. 
Instead of responding as  independent self-interested individuals to market signals in the economic 
arena, people are  to develop and sustain themselves as  interdependent social beings as  they 
participate together in making consumption and production decisions. 
Both the market. socialist model envisaged by the liberal-democratic socialists and the 
participatory socialist model envisaged by the communitarian socialists are  sharply differentiated 
from the CP-directed socialism of the past. In the following two sections of this paper I will 
consider market socialism and participatory socialism in more detail, by posing and attempting to 
respond to questions that  each of them must face from skeptical critics. In the final section I will 
offer my own conclusions about the kind of system that  offers the best promise of a socialism for 
the future. 
11. Market Socia l im 
The idea of a market-based form of socialism was first given serious attention in the 
1920s, when i t  was promoted by people within the social-democratic wing of Marxism a s  a 
desirable alternative to the marketless form of socialism identified with Marx's vision of full 
communism and embraced by the Bolshevik wing of Marxism. The first systematic theoretical 
exposition of the functioning of a market socialist economy was undertaken by Oskar Lange in the 
1930s, who has ever since been recognized as  the pioneer of.market s ~ c i a l i s m . ~  Lange's original 
model involved both actual markets (in consumer goods and labor), simulated markets (in producer 
goods), and a limited but critical role for central planning (e.g., in determining the rate of 
investment and the distribution of income). All enterprises were to be owned by the government, 
but run according to profit.-maximizing rules by independent managers. Since Lange's exposition 
of his original model of market socialism, a great deal of work has been done by advocates of 
market socialism -- many of them economists from andlor interested in the post-World-War-I1 
Eastern European countries -- seeking to improve upon Lange's model while dealing with various 
problems raised by  critic^.^ 
Out of this continuing literature on the conceptualization of market socialism has emerged 
a variety of different models, but they all share the same central defining purpose. Market 
socialism seeks to promote socialist goals of equity, democracy, and solidarity while largely 
retaining one major feature of capitalist economies -- the market -- but largely replacing another 
major feature of capitalism -- private ownership of the means of production. For a t  least the 
major sectors and/or the most important enterprises in the economy, market socialists propose 
some form of social ownership of enterprises. 
"Ownership" is a complex concept encompassing a variety of rights, which can potentially 
be assigned to a variety of different peoljle. For our purposes it will be useful to identify and 
distinguish two such rights in particular: (1) the right to enterprise control and the right to 
enterprise income. The right to control confers the prerogatives and responsibilities of 
management: those who control the enterprise (or their representatives) make the decisions about 
how the enterprise will be operated, who will work in it and under what conditions, whether or not 
the any aspects of the enterprise are to be expanded, contracted, sold or liquidated, etc. The right 
7. See Lange (1936-37) and Lange and Taylor (1938). Abba Lerner also made seminal 
contributions to the early literature on market socialism; see Lerner (1934) and (1936). 
8. For a brief survey of the history of the idea of market socialism, see Brus (1987); for a recent 
contribution to the literature on conceptualizing market socialism, see Nove (1991). 
to income confers a claim to the surplus generated by the enterprise -- i.e., the net (or residual) 
income after fixed obligations have been paid.g 
The standard capitalist enterprise is owned by private individuals or shareholders who 
have (ultimate) control over management according to the nature and the amount of their 
ownership shares; typically a small number of individuals or shareholders have predominant. 
control. Under market socialism enterprise control is social rather than private. Control of a 
market socialist enterprise is held by a community of people, each of whom -- in principle -- has an 
equal say in the management of the enterprise; as a practical matter, this (ultimate) control is 
usually exercised via appointment of managerial staff. There are two principal variants of such 
social control, depending on the nature of the community in whom control rights are vested: 
(1) Public management: enterprises are run by managers who are appointed by and 
accountable to an agency of government (at the national, regional, or local level), which 
agency represents a corresponding politically-constituted community of citizens. lo 
(2) Worker self-management: enterprises are run by managers who are appointed by and 
accountable to those who work in them (or their elected representatives), with control 
rights resting ultimately with the community of enterprise workers (on a one-person one- 
vote basis). l l 
9. In this context the enterprise surplus should be defined to include also any capital gains or 
losses. 
10. Examples of recent models of market socialism characterized by public management include 
those of John Roemer (1991) and Leland Stauber (1977). 
11. Examples of recent models of market socialism featuring worker self-management include 
those of David Schweickart (1980) and David Ellerman (1990) -- though in Schweickart's model 
the national government retains control over net capital formation, and Ellerman does not 
explicitly use the term "market socialism"). 
In the standard capitalist enterprise, ownership by private individuals or shareholders 
conveys not only control rights but also income rights -- again according to the nature and the 
amount of their ownership shares. Under market socialism income rights are held socially rather 
than privately. The surplus of the market socialist enterprise accrues to a community of people in 
a relatively egalitarian manner. Here again there are two principal variants of such social claims 
to income, depending on the nature of the community holding the claim: 
(1) Public surplus appropriation; the surplus of the enterprise is distributed to an agency of 
government (at the national, regional, or local 1evel);representing a corresponding community of 
citizens. 12 
(2) Worker surplus appropriation: the surplus of the enterprise is distributed to enterprise 
workers. l3 
These two different ways of assigning control rights and income rights under market 
socialism can generate a matrix of four different possible market socialist models, since there is no 
a priori reason why each set of rights must be assigned in the same way. As it happens, 
however, most contemporary advocates of market socialism lean primarily in one direction or the 
other: there is one school favoring what I will label the "public enterprise model," characterized by 
public management and public surplus appropriation, and a second school favoring the "worker 
enterprise model," characterized by worker self-management and worker surplus appropriation. l4 
12. For example, in Roemer's model of market socialism, (most of the) enterprise surpluses flow 
back to the national government to be distributed (in large part) to the general public in an 
equitable manner a s  a "social dividend;" in Stauber's model, local government agencies receive 
enterprise capital income qua shareholders and either use it for local public purposes or 
redistribute it to local citizens. 
13. For example, in both Schweickart's and Ellerman's models of worker self-management, the 
enterprise surplus accrues strictly to its workers -- though there are taxes andtor other charges 
which must first be paid to government. 
14. Roemer's and Stauber's models of market socialism represent different kinds of public 
enterprise models, while Ellerman's is a worker enterprise model; Schweickart's is predominantly 
Although the replacement of private with social control and income rights a t  the enterprise 
level is what most clearly distinguishes market socialism from (market) capitalism, advocates of 
market socialism also generally call for a greater degree of government intervention into markets 
than is the norm in capitalist economies. Such intervention does not primarily take the form of 
quantitative controls, of the kind associated with the discredited system of centrally planned 
socialism. Instead, it involves more extensive government provision of public goods and services, 
more extensive public capital formation, more extensive government regulation of enterprises, and 
more extensive use of taxes and subsidies to internalize external effects that would otherwise be 
neglected by individual consumers and producers in the market environment. The objective here is 
to shape the environment in which the market operates, and to use the market rather than 
replace it, so that market price and cost valuations will approximate true social benefits and 
costs. l5 The difference between market socialism and capitalism in this respect is essentially one 
of degree rather than kind; apart from public control and income rights in enterprises, the 
economic role of government in a market socialist system differs little from that of government in 
the more regulated (e.g., social-democratic) capitalist systems. 
Market socialism has been challenged both by those who question the ability of markets to 
function efficiently in the absence of capitalist private property rights, and by those who question 
the ability of social ownership forms to meet socialist goals in the context of markets. I have 
discussed elsewhere (Weisskopf, 1992) the former line of criticism; here I will focus on the concern 
that market socialism is not really socialist enough. This latter concern tends to revolve around 
one or more of the following three questions. 
a worker enterprise model, but includes some characteristics of a public enterprise model -- e.g., 
government control over net capital formation. 
15. Market valuations are expected to reflect "true" social benefits and costs to a much greater 
extent under market socialism than under capitalism not only because of the greater degree of 
internalization of externalities, but also because of the more equal distribution of income that 
results from the socialization of enterprise income rights; thus overall market demand will not 
disproportionately reflect the demands of a minority of wealthy individuals. 
1. Isn't any kind of market system fundamentally inefficient? 
Rejecting the conventional view that markets contribute to efficiency, some critics argue 
that any kind of market system -- capitalist or socialist -- will inevitably succumb to serious 
inefficiencies for the following reasons: 
(a) As is well known, markets do not internalize external effects; and external effects of 
one kind or another are far more widespread than is conventionally recognized. 
(b) By rewarding people for contributions of labor but not property, market socialism does 
get rid of capitalist rewards to pure property ownership -- which not only have unequal 
distributional consequences but are not really necessary to assure deployment of the 
property in production. Yet market socialism, like capitalism, maintains labor income 
rewards to people's natural abilities when such rewards are also not really necessary to 
elicit the deployment of those abilities in production. A truly efficient (and morejust) 
system of economic remuneration would have payment linked solely to differential personal 
effort and personal sacrifice. 
(c) Markets provide an environment in which people are encouraged to find ways to better 
themselves a t  the expense of others -- through rent-seeking behavior, self-aggrandizing 
coalitions, etc.; as a result, there will be a systematic tendency for the general interest to 
be undermined by the pursuit of particular interests. 
Each of these arguments is theoretically plausible; yet the challenges posed to market 
socialism can be answered along the following lines: 
(a) The market need not be powerless to internalize externalities: where such externalities 
can be recognized and (at least roughly) measured, changes in property rights and/or 
judiciously imposed taxes and subsidies can force market participants to take them into 
account in their independent decentralized decision-making. 
&I) To the extent that unwarranted returns to a person due to their luck in the "genetic 
lottery" can be measured, they can be taxed away. 
ic) Rent-seeking behavior, self-aggrandizing coalitions, etc., of one kind or another can and 
will occur under any conceivable system of economic organization that permits some people 
to live better than others; virtually every system will therefore require institutions that 
limit anti-social behavior. The only way in which an economic system of organization per 
se could eradicate the problem would be if that system -- by virtue of its controls on 
individual patterns of living -- precluded any individual from enjoying the- gains from self- 
interested behavior. Thus a solution to the problem of such behavior could come only a t  
the price of strict limits on privacy and freedom of choice. 
2 .  Won't any kind of market system inhibit the achievement of such socialist objectives as equity, 
democracy and solidarity? 
Critics of the "market" within market socialism find not only its claim to efficiency 
suspect; they question even more strongly whether a market system can achieve the objectives 
that are supposed to distinguish socialism sharply from capitalism. In particular, they raise the 
following kinds of questions: 
(a) Won't market socialism generate an elite minority of "coordinators" l6 -- e.g., public 
investment bankers, public enterprise directors, self-managed-firm managers, even 
government planners -- who end up gaining disproportionate economic and political power, 
much as  do capitalists within a capitalist system, thereby precluding achievement of 
socialist egalitarian and democratic objectives? 
16. This term "coordinator" has been introduced by Albert and Hahnel (1981) to characterize the 
managers and beneficiaries of the CP-directed socialist economies, but it would seem equally 
appropriate as  a term to characterize any small group .of people who are able to parlay critical 
decision-making roles in a social system into disproportionate political and economic power. 
(b) Don't markets of any kind tend to breed selfish motives and competitive behavior on 
the part  of producers and consumers, dividing people instead of uniting them, encouraging 
indifference to rather than empathy for others, and discouraging the development of 
public-spirited community consciousness and solidarity? 
These questions do highlight certain inevitable characteristics of market systems. Under 
market socialism there must be some people occupying positions of key decision-making 
responsibility, and in all likelihood such people will have higher incomes a s  well a s  greater power 
than most of the rest of the population. To transact effectively in markets people do have to think 
mainly in terms of their own individual (or family) welfare, while setting aside consideration for 
others; markets encourage anonymity, autonomy, and mobility rather than community, empathy 
and solidarity. l7 Yet all this does not necessarily mean that  any market system is incompatible 
with important and distinctively socialist goals -- for the following reasons: 
(a) Although inequalities of income and power would surely develop under market 
socialism, they would just a s  surely be much smaller than under capitalism -- because 
market socialism eliminates income returns to property ownership, which is the 
predominant source of inequalities under capitalism. While there would still be ample 
scope for inequalities associated with differential skills, talents, positions and even luck, it 
is hard to see how the equivalent of a propertied capitalist class could emerge from the 
more privileged strata of a market socialist society. Although a market system could not 
assure anything close to full equality of income and power for all participants, neither 
could any economic system in a complex society. Such societies require complex decision- 
making institutions of one kind or another; and there are bound to be great differences 
among people in their ability (or desire) to participate effectively in decision-making 
processes. 
17. See Bowles (1991) for a very suggestive analysis of the impact of markets, as cultural 
institutions, on the process of human development. 
(b) Market socialism admittedly does not provide direct support for a culture of community, 
empathy and solidarity; yet it surely provides a less hostile environment for the 
development of such characteristics than (market) capitalism -- because it attenuates, via 
greater egalitarianism and stronger democracy, the consequences of unfettered markets 
and unrestricted private property ownership. Although economic institutions are powerful 
social and cultural forces, they are neither monolithic nor omnipotent; hence community, 
empathy and solidarity may be fostered in other spheres of life even in a market system. 
3. Doesn't market socialism essentially amount to a social- democratic variant of capitalism? And, if 
so, why not simply embrace the latter? 
Advocates of social democracy share the socialist objectives of advocates of market 
socialism, but they differ a s  to the best means to achieve them. Where market socialism seeks to 
promote equity, democracy and solidarity primarily by transferring capitalist ownership rights to 
communities of citizens andlor workers, social democracy seeks to do so by government policy 
measures designed to constrain the behavior of capitalist owners and to empower other market 
participants. Thus social democrats do not try to do away with either the market or private 
property ownership; instead, they attempt to create conditions in which the operation of a 
capitalist market economy will lead to more egalitarian outcomes and encourage more democratic 
and more solidaristic practices than would a more conventional capitalist system. 
The kinds of government policies applied to bring this about are best illustrated by the 
experience of Sweden in the first three decades after World War 11, during which time the Social 
Democratic party held power uninterruptedly. These policies include (a) support for strong and 
encompassing labor unions; (b) a very broad and highly redistributive system of taxation and 
public spending; (c) a strong role for government in managing the macroeconomy and regulating 
business behavior; and (d) an "active labor market policy" designed to minimize unemployment 
while maintaining substantial labor mobility and flexibility. l8 
Market socialists have traditionally been highly suspicious of social democracy, on the 
ground that its failure to attack head-on the source of capitalist power -- private ownership of the 
means of production -- would ultimately prevent it from attaining socialist objectives. But as 
models of market socialism have been refined over the years, the distinction between market 
socialism and social democracy has been somewhat blurred. Partly because of the problematic 
experience of East European CP-directed socialist economies with limited market-oriented 
economic reforms, advocates of market socialism have come to support an increasingly wide scope 
for markets. The trend has been to bring in more and more of the institutions of a market 
capitalist economy, or to seek to mimic those institutions very closely. This trend is particularly 
evident in the treatment of decision-making in the area of capital investment and finance, which 
are increasingly being removed by market socialists from direct government control to capitalist- 
style financial market institutions in order to extend the logic of efficient decentralization and 
market discipline. l9 While this does not amount to the restoration of full capitalist private 
property rights, it does open up opportunities for individuals to receive some forms of capital 
income. . . 
The elimination of large-scale private property ownership under market socialism certainly 
leads to a much more equal distribution of income than obtains under conventional capitalism. 
Both theory and the actual experience of social democracy, however, suggest that government 
taxation and spending programs can substantially reduce the extent of income and wealth 
inequalities within a capitalist economy. As far as the pattern of enterprise management is 
I 
I 
18. There is a vast literature on the Swedish model of and experience with social democracy; for 
a brief summary of its economic features, see Carson (1990), chapters 15 and 16. 
19. This evolution in the thinking of advocates of market socialism toward an increasing role for 
markets can be seen very clearly in the differences between Brus (1972) and Brus and Laski 
(1989). 
concerned, there is also good reason to question how far market socialism really differs from social 
democracy. Market socialist enterprise managers, whether accountable to government agencies or 
to enterprise workers, are expected to operate their enterprises in such a way as  to maintain 
profitability in a market environment this means that they will typically have only limited leeway 
to steer the enterprises in a direction much different than would managers accountable to 
privately  shareholder^.^^ And, indeed, to prevent autonomous public enterprises or worker self- 
managed firms from acting in their own particular interest, as against the general social interest, 
it would in all likelihood be necessary for government to regulate them or their markets just as is 
done by social-democratic governments in a capitalist economy. 
At a more fundamental level, market socialism does not dispense with individual gain 
incentives and the necessarily associated inequalities. Instead, it seeks: 
(a) to link differences in rewards more closely to corresponding differentials in actual 
productive effort (for example, by eliminating or a t  least diminishing the individual 
material rewards accruing in a market capitalist system to sheer property ownership or to 
sheer natural talent -- neither of which serve any functional purpose in eliciting greater 
productive effort than would otherwise be deployed); and 
20. Some critics of market socialism have argued that a market socialist system is fundamentally 
unstable, bound to veer back to a form of capitalism under the pressures on enterprises imposed 
by competition in a market environment. Certainly market competition restricts the scope of 
viable options for any kind of producing enterprise; but the argument that it obliterates 
distinctions among enterprise types is based on a very unrealistic economic model of capitalism -- 
one in which "black-box" firms face no problems of contract enforcement, worker motivation, et . . ;  
only under such restrictive assumptions is there no room a t  all for discretionary decision-making 
by firm management and is the market all-determining. For a stimulating debate on these issues, 
see the exchange between Arnold (1987) and Schweickart (1987). 
(b) to reduce the extent of differences ir, rewards associated with differentials in productive 
effort, so as  to reduce (greatly) the resultant distributional inequity without reducing 
(much) the incentives they generate.2 
Again, this is precisely what social democracy tries to do -- albeit in a different way than 
market socialism. Social democracy achieves greater egalitarianism via ex post government taxes 
and subsidies, where market socialism does so via ex ante changes in patterns of enterprise 
ownership. As for serving the general social interest, market socialists and social democrats agree 
that, where the unfettered market will not achieve important social goals, the first option is to try 
to guide the market toward socially optimal behavior (via appropriate taxes, subsidies, etc., to 
internalize externalities by "planning with the market"); where this is not adequate, the second 
option is to replace price-and-market mechanisms by quantitative controls and/or direct state 
operation of enterprises. 
On further reflection, one might well ask of market socialists: what compelling reason is 
there to restrict forms of enterprise ownership to types in which control and income rights accrue 
to (citizen or worker) communities rather than to private shareholders? Why not simply provide a 
level market playing field in which all types of enterprises can compete on a truly equal basis? 
Most contemporary market socialist models in any case allow for individual or small-scale private 
enterprise. Could not the problems of excessive wealth and power associated with large-scale 
private enterprise be addressed as  easily and successfully via taxation and regulation as via 
restrictions on private ownership? 
To sustain the superiority of the market socialist over the social democratic approach to 
achieving socialist objectives, an advocate of market socialism would argue as  follows. In 
redefining and reassigning (to workers and/or communities) rights that form the point of departure 
2 1. As Miller (1989, p.30) has put it: "for markets to operate effectively, individuals and 
enterprises must receive primary profits, but the proportion of those profits that they need to keep 
as private income depends on how far they require material (as opposed to moral) incentives." 
for markets, market socialism intervenes into the market system before markets operate -- while 
social democracy intervenes (mainly) after markets operate. This makes social democracy much 
more vulnerable to weakening or disintegration under political challenge, since tax-and-subsidy 
schemes and government regulation are much easier to reverse than changes in property rights.22 
Moreover, the maintenance of property-owning capitalists under social democracy assures the 
presence of a disproportionately powerful class with a continuing interest in challenging social 
democratic government policies. Under market socialism there may well emerge a kind of 
managerial class with disproportionate power; but its power is likely to be less disproportionate 
because enterprise control rights and personal wealth.wil1 not be so highly concentrated. 
111. Participatory Socialism 
Although market socialism has become relatively popular on the Left in recent years, there 
is a much older socialist tradition that has always rejected the idea of including markets in 
anything other than a transitional phase following capitalism. Karl Marx wanted to rid the world 
not only ofthe inequalities associated with private property, but of the alienation and commodity 
fetishism associated with the operation of market systems. This was the Marxist tradition 
embraced by the Russian Bolshevik revolutionaries, and it remained an important part of the 
ideology -- though not the practice -- of Soviet socialism for decades after the Revolution of 1917. 
In point of fact, none of the "actually existing'' CP-directed socialist economies of the USSR, 
22. The experience of Sweden since the mid-1970s is often cited to show the vulnerability of social 
democracy to pressures to move toward a more traditional form of capitalism. For informative 
analyses of the trials of the Swedish model of social democracy in recent years, see Lundberg 
(1985) and Pontusson (1987). 
Eastern Europe, China, Cuba, etc., came close to dispensing with markets23 -- even though they 
limited the operation of markets in many ways. 
Contemporary participatory socialists seek to revive this marketless Marxist ideal, but in a 
manner very different from that of the Bolshevik tradition. First of all, they reject the 
authoritarian rule associated with the CP-directed socialist economies and insist instead on a 
democratic political framework. Second, they reject the hierarchical central planning apparatus 
that has hitherto been utilized as the main alternative to market exchange and insist instead on a 
.process of decentralized planning in whch people participate as  equals. 
Just  as in the case of market socialism, ideas-and conceptions of a marketless 
participatory socialism have been developed in various ways by various authors -- starting with 
utopian socialists even before Marx and continuing through anarcho-syndicalists down to present- 
day advocates of democratic and participatory planning. Most recently, important contributions to 
the literature on participatory socialism -- providing unusual and laudable detail on the actual 
institutions and functioning of a decentralized democratic planning system -- have been published 
by Pat Devine and by Michael Albert and Robin ~ a h n e 1 . ~ ~  In what follows I will refer in 
particular to the model of "participatory economics" proposed by Albert and Hahnel, since it 
represents the most extensively developed model of participatory socialism yet to be published. 
Albert and Hahnel ( 1 9 9 1 ~ ~  p.62) have summarized their model as follows: 
"The economic model a t  the heart of [participatory economics] uses new production, consumption 
and allocation institutions to promote solidarity, variety, and participatory self-management. The 
vision stands on three central elements: 
23. The period of "War Communism" in the Soviet Union during the civil war years immediately 
after the Bolshevik Revolution constitutes an exception to this assertion, but.of course one 
associated with exceptional circumstances. 
24. See Devine (1988) and Albert and Hahnel (1991a) and (1991b); of the Albert and Hahnel 
works, the former is a highly accessible popular presentation of their model, while the latter 
provides a more rigorous and technical presentation of their ideas. 
* An organizational mechanism for removing hierarchv from work by redefining 
work into 'balanced job compleses.' This innovation eliminates the problem of 
conceptual workers dominating manual workers by combining these opposed roles 
so that no separate categories of these sorts remain. 
* A distributive mechanism for attaining material equitv by promoting 
consumption according to a combination of need and effort. This innovation 
ensures that. each actor benefits in proportion as  the community as  a whole, 
thereby gaining a material, social, and emotional interest in cooperation and 
solidarity aimed a t  the greatest good for all. 
: -4 decision-making process based on the groportionate participat.ion of all 
workers and consumers in an informed negotiation in which actors collectively 
decide what is produced, with what methods, and how it is distributed, all in light 
of one another's circumstances and with a say proportionate to their involvement 
in each decision's implications. This eliminates central planning's denial of self 
management and inculcation of widespread passivity by eliminating any top or 
center. And it eliminates the alienation and antisocial and allocative biases typical 
of markets by instituting informed participation and mutuality of aims." 
The basic decision-making units of the participatory system are workplace workers' 
councils and neighborhood consumers' councils, in which production and consumption decisions are 
made collectively by workplace and neighborhood communities, respectively. But these basic 
decision-making units are embedded in a whole network of related councils, designed to bring to 
bear relevant considerations and concerns that. transcend the scope of individual workplaces and 
neighborhoods. Thus workplace workers' councils are linked to regional and industry council 
federations, and neighborhood consumers' councils are linked to ward, city, county, state and 
regional councils. Also involved in the network of non-market decision-making institutions are a 
variety of "facilitation boards" -- for production, employment, community membership, 
information updating and plan iteration. The latter two boards play a crucial role in assuring that 
production and consumption plans emanating from all the workplaces and neighborhoods are 
ultimately modified so as  to converge to a feasible overall pattern of production and consumption. 
Advocates of this kind of participatory economic system assert that it can attain far more 
successfully than market socialism the socialist goals of egalitarianism, democracy and solidarity - 
- because of the absence of markets -- while performing a t  least as  efficiently as a market system 
-- U t e  of the absence of markets. Advocates of market socialism, on the other hand, find this 
effort to do without markets highly quixotic and thoroughly problematical. The major questions 
raised by market socialists to challenge participatory socialism can be grouped into two categories, 
according to whether they challenge the feasibility or the h i rab i l i ty  of marketless participatory 
socialism. 
1. Is it really feasible to allocate resources in a complex econom? without the market? 
Since Adam Smith's original exposition of the mechanism of the "invisible hand," 
advocates of the market have celebrated its ability to process the enormous amount of information 
necessary for coordinated economic decision-making in a complex economy and to convey it in a 
simple way to individual economic actors: so that they have both the information and the incentive 
to act in an economically efficient manner. Most economists believe that the only other way that 
resources can be allocated in a comples economy is via a centralized, hierarchical system of 
administrative commandsa5 -- the system that has been so deeply discredited by the experience of 
the CP-directed socialist economies. Albert and Hahnel take up directly the challenge to develop a 
third resource allocational mechanism that avoids both the use of markets and the hierarchy of an 
administrative command system. 
To replace the market without using administrative commands, they propose an enormous 
number and a vast network of decision-making bodies on which individuals will sit, process 
information, deliberate, and arrive a t  decisions. Precisely because they don't trust the information 
summarized in and conveyed by market prices, they require these decision-making bodies to 
consider in detail the quantitative and qualitative implications of alternative ways of allocating 
resources. This places some staggering requirements on the system as a whole: 
25. I refrain deliberately from using the term "central planning" to describe this system, since the 
literature on such systems demonstrates clearly that their planning mechanisms have been unable 
to bring about the coordinated fulfillment of any kind of consistent central plan; see, for example, 
Wilhelm (1985). 
(a) to involve every single person in the society (save presumably the young and 
the infirm) in consumption and production decision-making processes, via their 
participation in consumer and worker councils -- and in some cases also various 
facilitation boards; 
03) to compile an enormous amount of information about the economy and to make 
that  information available in a timely and accessible way to all of the individuals 
engaged in economic decision-making a t  one level or another (of course, every 
individual need not know everything about the economy, but each individual must 
have access to informatioil about the ramifications of his or her own production and 
consumption decisions throughout the rest of the economy); 
(c) to develop a system of accounting -- a s  a n  alternative to conventional market 
prices -- that  enables the social value of different production and consumption 
activities to be measured and compared, so that  individual decision-makers can 
understand the aggregate consequences of any given set of decisions; 
(d) to develop a way of measuring the effort expended in different types of work 
activities, and the benefits realized from different types of consumption activities, 
so as to be able to determine whether production efforts and consumption benefits 
are fairly allocated; 
(e) to find a way for the group of people involved in any given decision-making body 
to arrive in a reasonably harmonious and timely fashion at agreement on decisions; 
and 
(f) to develop a system to assure that  the myriad plans developed a t  the ground 
level of the decision-making network (the neighborhood consumer councils and the 
workplace production councils), when aggregated, converge to a consistent pattern 
of resource allocation for the economy as  a whole; here they have in mind a process 
of iteration and ~nodification of plans a s  they travel up and down geographical- 
administrative levels of the network. 
The mere listing of these requirements is enough to generate skepticism about whether 
and how they can possibly be met. Even if, in principle, institutions and processes can be 
developed to meet these requirements (and Albert and Hahnel, as well as others such as  Devine, 
have advanced some ingenious ideas to do so), one is bound to wonder whether the whole system 
would actually function in practice. .Wouldn't participatory planning require each individual to 
dedicate so much time, interest and energy to acquiring information and participating in decision- 
making meetings that most people would get sick of doing it? Indeed, isn't the practice of 
participatory democracy sufficiently difficult, time-consuming and emotionally draining that it 
ought to be economized -- used only for the most critical of sociaYpoliticaUeconomic decisions, 
rather than for every aspect of the resource allocation 
My comments thus far have focused on whether a participatory socialist system can 
possibly find a way to accomplish the information-processing role of the market. The other major 
function of the market.is to motivate actors to consume and to produce in a consistent and 
appropriate way. The market system does this by structuring individual material rewards and 
penalties, in such a way that individual actors -- behaving as  homo economicus, i.e., pursuing their 
own self-interest -- will choose to undertake economic actions in a consistent and appropriate way. 
Participatory socialism very explicitly rejects this market motivational scheme, viewing it as a 
prime source of overall inefficiency, inequality, and the fostering of individualistic and selfish 
rather than socially-conscious and cooperative behavior. 
Albert and Hahnel are clear that individual material incentives should not play a major 
role in motivating socially and economically desirable action, or discouraging socially and 
economically undesirable action, in their participatory economy -- though they do not rule out such 
rewards, as long as they are consciously allocated by decision-making people rather impersonally 
allocated by a market-like mechanism. But what, then, would serve primarily to replace the 
incentive system of the market? There are a number of possibilities, to many of which they 
allude. On the positive motivational side, people could derive satisfaction (a) from the intrinsic 
interest of the more enjoyable parts of their own balanced job complex, (b) from fulfilling their 
responsibilities to others in the society, and/or (c) from a vicarious sharing in the enjoyment 
derived by others from consumption and production activities. On the negative motivational side, 
people could be discouraged from antisocial behavior by (d) the watchfulness and peer pressure of 
fellow consumers and workers, and/or (e) the practical inability of getting away with such 
behavior (whether it is excessively high consumption or excessiveiy. low production) in a society 
committed to egalitarianism. 
In order for such mechanisms to add up to a workable system of motivation which could 
replace individual material market incentives, there would surely have to be a wholesale 
conversion of human behavior patterns from homo economicus to what might best be characterized 
as  homo socialis -- i.e., a person whose very consciousness was socially rather than individually 
oriented. It is a fundamental premise of Marxism that  people are strongly influenced by their 
socio-economic environment -- that  people's values and behavior can and will become different a s  
historical and socio-economic conditions change. Accepting this premise,.one can envisage that  in 
a participatory economic environment people would develop the attitudes and capabilities that  
make a participatory system work. What remains to be examined, however, is the process 
whereby both the needed institutions and the needed values and behavior patterns would emerge. 
I will return to this question in the final section of the paper. 
2 .  Is it really desirable to establish a socialist system without markets? 
Even if it can be shown that  participatory socialism is feasible, there remain some 
important questions about whether i t  would be desirable to build such a system. These questions 
go to the fundamental values that  inform the movement for socialism; and i t  is here that  the most 
critical differences between market and participatory socialists may well lie. 
Why should a socialist, committed to the goals of equity, democracy and solidarity, harbor 
doubts about the desirability of a feasible participatory socialist system? There are indeed a 
number of possible grounds:26 
(a) In spite of its principled commitment to egalitarianism and democracy, the process of 
decision-making in Albert and Hahnel's participatory economy might in fact enable some 
people to exercise much greater influence over decisions than others. Disproportionate 
influence would not arise from disproportionate income or wealth, but potentially from 
disproportionate interest in and aptitude for participatory decision-making processes. In 
other words, some people are likely to be much more interested in -- or better at -- 
accessing and processing information, and influencing group decision-making, than others. 
(b) Another important concern about the nature of the democracy fostered by participatory 
socialism is whether it can adequately protect the legitimate interests of those who hold 
and wish to act on minority views. True democracy requires not only that  people have 
more or less equal influence over decisions that  affect them to the same degree, but that 
minorities be protected from majority decisions -- however equally and fairly they are 
arrived at -- which disadvantage them in important ways. Under participatory socialism 
there are many important decision-making bodies that  are expected to operate according to 
consensus or, if that can't be reached, by majority vote. Citizens are encouraged -- indeed 
required -- to exercise a great deal of voice in participating in these decision-making bodies. 
If a decision doesn't go the way of a particular individual or group, however, the 
26. Many of the points listed here were made earlier by Folbre (1991, pp.67-70). 
opportunities for exit are limited: changing workplaces or neighborhoods remains possible, 
but one cannot be confident that this would be easy to do in practice.27 
(c) Although not a goal that is usually voiced explicitly by socialists, freedom of choice -- of 
how to live, what to consume, what kind of work to do, how to express oneself, how to 
define one's social identity, etc. -- is an important value. A non-market participatory 
system requires people to justify many of their choices along these lines to some kind of 
collective decision-making body, which is bound to limit the extent to which people can 
really get their choices accepted -- no matter how democratically decision-making bodies 
.are c ~ n s t i t u t e d . ~ ~  By enabling individuals to make most choices without reference to what 
others think about their decisions, a market system provides much greater freedom of this 
kind. Of course it does so only for people who have the wherewithal to afford alternative 
choices; thus for a market system to promote meaningful freedom of choice for all, the 
distribution of income must be reasonably equitable. 
(d) The proposal for balanced job complexes in a participatory socialist society -- with each 
individual rotating through a variety of jobs of widely varying degrees of desirability -- is 
designed to avoid the hierarchy of power, income and prestige that tends to develop when 
people specialize in particular jobs. But many people are likely to prefer doing more 
specialized work activities than would be permitted under a balanced-job-complex 
requirement,. which means that enforcement of the requirement might well involve implicit 
27. Of coures, changing workplaces or neighborhoods is not that easy to do in practice for many 
people in market economies either; but the point is that market economies offer individuals or 
minorities other kinds of opportunities for exit when they make choices that differ from those of 
the relevant majority. 
28. Even the option of switching workplaces and neighborhoods, or forming new ones, does not 
completely overcome this problem; aside from any difficulties in effecting such switches, there will 
be societal rules in a participatory economy which every workplace and neighborhood must adhere 
to, and no doubt many issues of interpretation of those rules which will call for socially-determined 
decisions. Of course, even the most individualistic society must adhere to some rules if it is to 
survive a t  all; but the point is that societal rules loom more important in a communitarian society 
in which people's responsibility to one another is elevated to a guiding principle. 
or explicit coercion. Moreover, many people might well prefer to have certain activities 
carried out by other specialists rather than by participants rotating through from the rest. 
of their balanced job complexes; not just brain surgery and airplane piloting come to mind 
here, but also such everyday activities as  teaching, writing and the performance of music, 
a r t  and sports. Apart from their inhibition of personal freedom, balanced job complexes 
designed to avoid specialization seem likely to deprive society of the benefits of activities 
performed well only by people who have devoted a disproportionate amount of time and 
effort to them.29 
Some of these questions about the desirability of participatory socialism stem from the 
attribution of substantial fundamental value to (at  least some kinds of and some extent of) 
individuality, privacy, freedom of choice, and specialized talents and abilities -- in addition to and 
alongside the more traditional socialist goals of equity, democracy and solidarity. The more 
weight one places on the former kind of objectives, the more skeptical one will be about the 
desirability of participatory socialism. 
IV. Conclusion 
Having raised many of the arguments both for and against the variants of socialism with 
the strongest claims to a future, I turn now to an attempt to decide on the one that  offers the most 
promise to achieve the basic goals of socialism. The most important choice to be made is between 
market socialism and participatory socialism. Before turning to that  choice, however, it will be 
useful to consider what kind of market socialism provides the best alternative to participatory 
socialism. 
29. As Moore (1980) has argued forcefully in a critique of Marx's vision of full communism, the 
material basis of cultural complexity is precisely the division of labor. 
A. Public Enterprise vs. Worker Enterprise Market Socialism 
Market socialism calls for the replacement of private by social control and income rights 
within a (government-guided) market environment. An important question for advocates of 
market socialism is whether to base the social rights on communities of citizens or workers. 
Should the rights to and the responsibility for enterprise management be vested in governmental 
agencies (democratically accountable to electorates of citizens) or in workers' councils 
(democratically accountable to electorates of enterprise workers)? Should the residual income of 
the enterprise accrue to the general public (via government agencies) or to enterprise workers? 
Advocates of public manapement stress its advantages vis-a-vis worker self-management 
with respect to what I label "capital efficiency" -- access to capital funds, encouragement of risk- 
taking, techological progress, e t ~ . ~ O  Advocates of public surplus appropriation stress its 
advantages with respect to equity a t  the societal level: channelling the residual income of 
enterprises into an aggregate "social dividend" recognizes the interdependence of aM production 
activities, protects workers and citizens against the potential risk and inequity of having their 
capital income tied to the performance of a particular enterprise (which may do well or do badly 
for reasons of luck rather than merit), and can distribute society's surplus much more equitably 
than when individual enterprises retain much of their own surplus. 
Advocates of worker self-management stress its advantages vis-a-vis public management 
in several different respects: (1) "labor efficiency" -- motivation of work effort and quality, 
disciplining of management, organizational improvement, e t ~ ; ~  (2) democracy: worker self- 
management a t  the enterprise level is in and of itself democratic, and may well reinforce 
democracy a t  the political level; and (3) solidarity: through greater participation in workplace and 
enterprise decision-making, workers may gain a stronger sense of solidarity with their fellow 
30. See Weisskopf (1991) for a detailed analysis of the efficiency characteristics of alternative 
systems of enterprise ownership. 
31. See Weisskopf (1991). 
workers. Advocates of worker surplus appropriation. stress its advantages with respect to labor 
efficiency and solidarity, as  workers' incomes are linked collectively to the performance of their 
enterprises. 
Clearly there are significant trade-offs here. Different kinds of social control rights are 
advantageous with respect to different kinds of efficiency considerations, and different kinds of 
social income rights are advantageous with respect to different socialist objectives of equity, 
democracy and solidarity. A reasonable solution to the dilemma of choice -- consistent with the 
overall spirit of compromise inherent in market socialism -- would be to encourage a mixture of 
public and worker control and income rights, emphasizing each in the particular circumstances in 
which it would do the most good. Such a compromise could take the form of promoting public 
management in those industries and enterprises characterized by relatively large economies of 
scale and/or relatively extensive externalities, and promoting worker self-management in 
industries and enterprises with smaller economies of scale andlor less significant ecternalities. 
Since income, unlike control, can easily be shared, it might well be best to promote patterns of 
enterprise income rights in which there is both a social dividend claim and an enterprise worker 
claim. 
B. Market Socialism vs. Participatory Socialism 
No such compromise solution is available for the choice between market and participatory 
socialism; here we are talking about fundamentally different systems whose principles must be 
accepted or rejected in  tot^.^^ To make this choice, socialists must confront two major, separable 
issues. The first issue is whether people can be expected to change from homo economicus, as we 
know himher in contemporary capitalist societies, to homo socialis, as helshe is depicted in he 
32. Obviously, a system cannot both have markets and be marketless. One could consider a 
compromise in which markets operate in certain spheres, while decentralized participatory 
planning institutions operate in others. However, I take advocates of participatory socialism to 
insist on the complete banning of markets -- on the grounds that any non-trivial amount of market 
activity corrodes the values and behavior patterns on which a participatory economic system 
depends for its success. 
operation of participatory socialist societies -- and, if so, how such a change could come about. The 
second issue is how much value we should attach to the opportunity for individuals to exercise 
such libertarian rights as freedom of choice, privacy, and the development of one's own specialized 
talents and abilities -- as compared to the more traditional socialist goals of equity, democracy and 
solidarity. 
In  the effort to build a socialist society, market socialists take the terrain of homo 
economicus to be the relevant one -- at least for the present and the foreseeable future. If people 
act essentially as  homo economicus, it follows that  a significant amount of inequality, hierarchy, 
competition, etc., are necessary ingredients of an efficient economic sys tem and this is one 
important reason for the market socialist acceptance of markets. Participatory socialists, on the 
other hand, believe that  for the construction of socialism within the foreseeable future homo 
economicus need not be an  unalterable fact. They argue (with Marx) that  homo economicus is the 
result of a particular pattern of historical development (and a related pattern of unequal power), 
which can be changed if people decide do so and act collectively on that  desire. The struggle for 
homo socialis can itself help to bring about the desired change in human values and behavior, 
which would then permit the socialist goals of equity, democracy, and solidarity-to be achieved 
with reasonable efficiency under a system dependent on participation and cooperation rather than 
autonomy and competition. 
Many market socialists -- for example, Alec Nove (1991, Par t  1) -- dismiss the idea of 
homo socialis a s  utopian, and on that  basis reject participatory socialism a s  utterly irrelevant to 
the fashioning of a "feasible" socialism for the foreseeable future. In the previous section I raised 
many of the arguments with which skeptics question the feasibility of a participatory economy, 
and these arguments have made a skeptic of me. I believe, however, that  even if we skeptics are 
wrong about the prospects for developing homo socialis, there remains a solid reason for turning 
away from the communitarian vision of socialism. 
Consider what i t  would take to move from here to there. The same Marxist reasoning that 
suggests that  homo socialis is perfectly possible, within a n  appropriately symbiotic institutio~al 
context, suggests that  people who have been living in a capitalist institutional environment will 
retain the characteristics of homo e c o n o m i ~ u s . ~ ~  How, then, could it be possible to move from 
homo economicus to homo socialis while respecting the current attitudes and preferences of the 
general public? I t  would appear that  only some kind of revolutionary vanguard could lead such a 
transformation, for a democratic process would reflect in large measure people's current mind 
sets. But we need hardly be reminded that  an undemocratic revolutionary process can easily lead 
not to the promised superior and democratic society of the future, but to a decidedly undemocratic 
and quite inferior alternative outcome. 
This reasoning does not rule out the possibility of any kind of democratic social change 
from contemporary conditions. I t  does suggest, however, that  such change must be gradual 
.enough so that  it is realistic to expect that  people -- as they are in their current socio-economic 
environment -- can be persuaded of the desirability of the change. This seems to me a compelling 
reason for pursuing socialism in terms of the more modest ambitions of market socialists. Even if 
one's ultimate hope is to progress to a participatory form of socialist society, a gradual move to 
.some form of market socialism -- which would begin to change the socio-economic environment in 
which people actually live in a more socialist direction -- would appear to be a necessary first step 
in achieving a democratic transition. 
Whether a subsequent transition from market socialism to participatory socialism would in 
fact be desirable remains an  open question. In my discussion of participatory socialism in the 
previous section I suggested that  certain libertarian objectives associated with personal freedom of 
choice can best be satisfied only if individuals have the kind of opportunities for choice (and for 
exit) that  markets can provide. While the replacement of markets with a participatory economic 
33. The same surely holds true for people who have been living in a CP-directed socialist 
institutional environment, where the motivational system remained rooted in individual material 
incentives. 
system would arguably contribute to a more egalitarian, democratic and solidaristic society, the 
point is that  i t  would do so a t  a cost in terms of libertarian objectives. 
It is undeniable that  such libertarian objectives smack of "bourgeois rights," while the 
objectives of equality, democracy and solidarity have traditionally been the most strongly 
associated with socialism. I submit, however, that  both kinds of objectives are important 
ingredients of a good society, and that  the task for socialists is to assure the attainment of both in 
significant measure. I therefore believe that market socialists are right to opt for a significant role 
for markets, recognizing that  this involves a sacrifice of some degree of equality, democracy and 
solidarity, but expecting that  i t  will deliver more freedom of choice, more respect for privacy, and 
greater development of personal talents and abilities. 
C. Democratic Self-Managed Market Socialism 
I have. thus concluded with an endorsement of market socialism. To emphasize that  
democracy should be the essential cornerstone of the socialist project -- in the process of transition 
as  well as in the organization of institutions -- I include the word "democratic" in my 
characterization of market socialism. And to emphasize tha t  democracy must be extended from 
the political to. the social to the economic sphere of life, I include also the word "self-managed." 
A democratic self-managed market socialism combines: 
(1) A liberal democratic political framework, under which government (at all levels) is 
accountable to citizens via regular democratic elections in a context of civil rights and civil 
liberties, and participatory democratic mechanisms are promoted a t  local levels where 
direct participation is feasible. 
(2) S o c i a l g h t s  to the control and the income of enterprisa(above a modest size), with 
these rights to be divided between communities of citizens and communities of workers 
according to pragmatic criteria. 
(3) Markets as the predominant mechanism for resource allocation, providing informational 
and incentive benefits a s  well as freedom of choice, with the. opportunities for exit afforded 
by markets complementing the opportunities for voice afforded by participatory democracy 
in local politics and enterprise self-management. 
(4) National economic policy direction, whereby the market is'rendered the servant rather 
than the master of society: the national government provides overall macroeconomic 
guidance and undertakes microeconomic intervention a s  needed -- not only via taxes and 
subsidies but also by running some enterprises (e.g., where natural monopolies exist), by 
providing certain goods and services (e.g., capital or consumption goods with strong public 
good characteristics), by assuring general social security (to maintain economic welfare for 
all), and by pursuing active-labor-market policies (to'keep unemployment down). 
Hoyever attractive and convincing this vision of socialism may be to its advocates, we 
must recognize that  its general appeal is still very limited. On the Right, i t  confronts powerful 
political forces and a powerful ideology favoring capitalism over socialism. On the Left, i t  faces 
obstacles even among people upset with the present system, convinced of the need for 
fundamental change and ready to embrace some form of socialism. 
The problem is that  the call for market socialism is simply not the kind of clarion call that  
is emotionally satisfying or politically inspirational; the case for market socialism is all too 
reasoned, too balanced, too moderate. This is its virtue, but also its Achilles' Heel. Who will rally 
behind its banner? If i t  is ever to get anywhere, i t  will need the backing of a strong political 
movement; and a political movement needs powerful rallying cries and effective popular 
mobilization to get off the ground. Democratic self-managed market socialism needs to resonate 
more fully and more clearly with public hopes and aspirations, or it is likely to remain a socialism 
fqJC the future but not Qf the. future. 
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